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Perspectives

The Instability of the Standard Justification
for Physician-Assisted Suicide
THOMAS A. CAVANAUGH

Proponents commonly justify the legalization of physician-assisted suicide
(PAS) in terms of a patient’s wanting
to die (autonomy) and the patient’s
having a medically established good
reason for suicide.1–4 These are the common elements of the standard justification offered for the legalization of
PAS. In what follows, I argue that these
two conditions exist in significant tension with one another, operating according to distinct dynamics that render
the justification for PAS an unstable
“let it be so” basis for public policy.
Moreover, no natural connection keeps
these two criteria united. Indeed — as I
argue — the two elements of the justification oppose and threaten to exclude
one another. Thus, the PAS justification is too labile a basis for sound public policy.
The PAS Justification:
The Simple Version
Those who justify PAS distinguish
between good and bad reasons for PAS.
The proposed good reasons are either
an imminently terminal illness or an
incurable progressively debilitating disease, such as multiple sclerosis.5 Other
reasons, for example, clinically treatable depression 6 or pain resulting from
inadequate palliative measures 7 are
regarded as unacceptable. The proposed good reasons are medical and
objective. Thus, a physician could establish that the patient actually does have

a good reason. The good reason, however, is not proposed as the only condition that must be met. In accordance
with the principle of autonomy, a
patient must also really —clearheadedly,
consistently, and persistently —want to
kill himself.8 If a patient wants to kill
himself and he has a good reason to
kill himself, then, according to the standard justification, his physician legally
ought to be able to assist him by providing him with a lethal drug.
The Complex Version:
The Motive Requirement
The standard justification is, however,
slightly more complicated. For, according to the standard justification, it is
not sufficient that the patient have a
good reason to kill himself and that he
want to kill himself, he must also want
to kill himself for the good reason. Thus,
his autonomy is subordinated to the
good reason. This may be called the
“motive requirement.” The standard
justification clearly incorporates the
motive requirement. The standard justification has safeguards to prevent
patients from killing themselves for bad
reasons.9
For example, the following passage
from the Oregon Act illustrates the
presence of the motive requirement:
If in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician a
patient may be suffering from a psy-
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chiatric or psychological disorder, or
depression causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer the
patient for counseling. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane
and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing
the counseling determines that the
person is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder, or
depression.10

Clearly, the Oregon Act rules out depression as an acceptable basis for PAS.
Again, in the Oregon Act, witnesses
attest that:
[T]he person signing this request [the
patient requesting PAS]: appears to
be of sound mind and not under
duress, fraud, or undue influence.11

The Oregon Act would not justify a
patient’s pursuing PAS if her reason
for doing so was to mollify a husband
or child tired of caring for her, or
because she understood herself to be a
burden to her loved ones.
The BANEC guidelines also incorporate the motive requirement:
The primary physician has ascertained the following. . . . 2. . . . the
patient is mentally competent and not
suffering from a depression that impairs decision-making capability. . . . 4.
To the best of the physician’s knowledge, the patient’s choice to hasten
death has been freely made, independent of finances, family, health care
workers, health insurance, or other
coercion.12

Another proposed justification mandates that:
[T]he physician must ensure that the
patient’s suffering and the request are
not the result of inadequate comfort
care. . . . The presence of depression
is relevant if it is distorting rational
decision making and is reversible in
a way that would substantially alter
104

the situation. Expert psychiatric evaluation should be sought when the primary physician is inexperienced in the
diagnosis and treatment of depression, or when there is uncertainty
about the rationality of the request or
the presence of a reversible mental
disorder the treatment of which would
substantially change the patient’s perception of his or her condition.13

With varying degrees of precision
and detail, the proposed justifications
for PAS each incorporate the motive
requirement by ruling out certain motives as unacceptable, leaving an imminently terminal illness or an intractable
chronically debilitating disease as the
sole acceptable motives for PAS.
What difference does the motive
requirement make? Examples illustrate its import. If some patient had
terminal cancer and wanted to die for
some other, unacceptable reason — for
example, because he was clinically depressed, or because his family wanted
him to die — then the standard justification justifies neither his suicide nor
others’ assistance. For, although he
wants to kill himself and he has a good
reason to kill himself, he does not want
to kill himself for the right reason. Of
course, advocates of PAS could tutor
him to want to kill himself for the right
reason. Nonetheless, that they would
have so to instruct him indicates that
they could not justify assisting him, at
least not according to the standard
justification.
Thus, the justifications propose that
PAS is justified if and only if the patient
wants to die for a medically substantiated good reason.
The Problem of Asymmetry
In what follows, I reflect on the elements of the standard justification in
order to determine what unites them.
To do this, I contrast the standard justification with the justification offered
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by soft-paternalists, who maintain that
a patient’s really wanting to die is a
sufficient reason for him to kill himself and a sufficient reason for a physician to assist him. Thus, the softpaternalist proposes autonomy as sufficient to justify PAS.14
Those employing the standard justification do not accept autonomy as sufficient to justify PAS. Yet, by rejecting
the soft-paternalist’s account, those who
rely on the standard justification have
difficulty justifying their position concerning those who have medically
established good reasons for killing
themselves but who do not want to
kill themselves. By examining such
cases, it becomes clear that the two
elements of the standard justification
do not have any intrinsic link uniting
them.
Consider the justification the softpaternalist would offer for a patient
who does not pursue PAS because he
does not want to die. The soft-paternalist’s position would be that the
patient’s really not wanting to die itself
justifies him in not killing himself and
justifies others in not convincing him
to kill himself. This position is exactly
symmetrical with the soft-paternalist’s
justification for PAS: autonomy is itself
a justification for pursuing what the
patient really wants, regardless of his
reasons for wanting it. Indeed, the
exactness of the symmetry between the
soft-paternalist’s justification for a
patient’s killing or not killing himself —
and for a physician’s assisting or not
assisting — indicates a strength of the
soft-paternalist’s position. Moreover, the
soft-paternalist’s response concerning
why we ought not to assist or convince a patient to kill himself who does
not want to kill himself — “he really
does not want to kill himself” — would
be enough for most to justify not assisting or convincing him to kill himself.
(Of course, this is not to argue for PAS
justified in terms of soft-paternalism;

it is only to note that soft-paternalism
does not suffer, as the standard justification does, from the problem of
asymmetry.)
Those who propose the standard justification hold, along with the softpaternalist, that a patient’s not wanting
to kill himself justifies both his not killing himself and others’ not assisting
him. This response, however, indicates a problematic asymmetry in the
standard justification. The standard justification requires a medically established reason for killing oneself and
for assisting another to kill himself; it
thereby subordinates the patient’s selfdetermination to a medically established good reason. Other reasons, for
example, being lonely or depressed, are
not acceptable. Yet, if the patient who
wants to kill himself is not to kill himself nor to be assisted either because
he lacks a good reason, or because,
although he has a good reason, he
wants to kill himself for an unacceptable reason, then what about those who
have medically established good reasons for killing themselves but who
do not want to kill themselves? According to the standard justification, if a
patient has a good reason to die but
does not want to die, he is not to be
assisted nor instructed that he ought
to kill himself. Why is his autonomy
not subordinated to his good reason
for killing himself? How does the standard justification justify his not killing
himself and others’ not instructing him
of the good reason he has for killing
himself?
Of course, most will agree that such
a patient ought not to kill himself if he
does not want to and that others ought
not to assist him or to instruct him to
kill himself. Nonetheless, in terms of
the standard justification, what grounds
one’s response to such a case? For, if
the autonomy of a patient who wants
to kill himself but lacks a good reason
is not sufficient to justify his suicide
105
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or a physician’s assistance, why is it
sufficient to justify not assisting or
instructing those who have good reasons to kill themselves but who do not
want to kill themselves? Moreover, if
the autonomy of a patient who wants
to die and who has a good reason to
die must be subordinated to his good
reason such that he must want to kill
himself for the good reason that he
has — and not for an unacceptable reason — then why is autonomy not subordinated to a good reason when a
patient has a good reason? What accounts for this asymmetry in the standard justification?
Responses to the
Asymmetry Problem
In response to the asymmetry objection, the advocate of the standard justification could argue that such patients
must have good countervailing reasons for wanting to live that outweigh
the good reasons they have for wanting to die. Yet, if one concedes — as
advocates of the standard justification
do —that some people who want to kill
themselves do not have good reasons,
then why think that there are not also
people who do not want to kill themselves but who do not have good reasons for not killing themselves? It is
reasonable to think that there must be
patients who, according to the standard justification, have overall good
reasons for killing themselves but who
do not want to kill themselves. What
about these patients?
The proponent of the standard justification could argue that more is
required for a patient to justify killing
himself than is required for a patient
to justify not killing himself. This is
the argument that one ought to err, as
it were, on the side of life, rather than
on the side of death. It is better, or so
this argument proposes, to have more
unjustified lives than unjustified deaths.
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This line of argument, however, inclines
away from legalizing PAS. Following
this line of reasoning, one would erect
legal barriers against homicide, such
as current laws outlawing suicideassistance, the very laws that advocates of PAS wish to change.
The advocate of the standard justification could refer to what is generally
agreed to: it is wrong to kill another
against his will. Yet, homicidal selfdefense, surely the most widely accepted
and least controversial case of legally
and ethically justified homicide, almost
always involves killing an assailant
against his will. Moreover, even if an
assailant did want to be killed, that
fact would not be relied on in a legal
or moral justification for killing him.
Homicide in self-defense is justified
without reliance on — indeed, usually
in opposition to — the autonomy of the
one killed. Such homicides are justified entirely in terms of the killer having a good reason for killing: in order
to preserve harmless human life. Thus,
the advocates of the standard justification must explain how they can assert
both that a person has what they consider a good reason for killing himself
(e.g., an imminently terminal illness)
and that it would be wrong to assist
him or to instruct him to commit suicide because he does not want to. For,
as seen in the justification of homicidal
self-defense, a justification that incorporates good reasons inclines away —
even entirely away — from regard for
what the one killed wants, relying on
the good reasons as sufficient to justify killing.
In response to the charge of asymmetry, the advocate of the standard justification could simply stipulate that
in order for a patient to kill himself —
and for a physician to assist him — it is
necessary, but not sufficient, that he
want to kill himself. Thus, a patient’s
not wanting to kill himself would suffice to justify his not killing himself
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and others’ not assisting or instructing
him, just as his not having a good reason for suicide, or his having a good
reason but wanting to kill himself for
a bad reason, suffices for rejecting his
request for assistance. The proponent
of the standard justification could maintain that such a stipulation is enough
given that we are considering public
policy; that is, something that often is
nothing but a “let it be so.” For example, we drive on one side of the road
rather than another by mere fiat. The
decision is entirely arbitrary. Nonetheless, it works. Traffic laws are broken,
but they are not broken because they
are arbitrary. The same holds true for
many other matters of public policy
that repose ultimately on a publicly
agreed upon “let it be so.” Why would
the case of PAS differ? Why can it not
rest ultimately on public fiat or merely
on the fact that sometimes we do not
accept autonomy as a sufficient reason
for honoring a patient’s request and
sometimes we do?
Perhaps the laws and public policy
regarding PAS could repose on a practice that holds that autonomy and a
medically established good reason are
not sufficient to justify PAS independently of one another. Yet, there are
good reasons for thinking that the
dynamics of these criteria will separate them in practice. That is, as I argue
in what follows, given the independent character of these two elements
taken separately, neither fiat nor custom offer a sound basis for the legalization of PAS.
The Directions of Pull of
Autonomy and Good Reasons
Autonomy and a medically established
good reason pull in different directions.
The soft-paternalist illustrates the dynamic of autonomy: as long as the patient really wants to kill herself and
does not harm others by killing herself,

then her suicide and others’ assistance
of her suicide are justified, regardless
of her objective medical reasons or
lack of reasons altogether. The pull of
autonomy would have suicide and
suicide-assistance grounded entirely in
the will unfettered by reason, to be furthered as long as no one else is harmed.
In opposition to the pull of autonomy,
the dynamic of a good reason — illustrated in the justification of homicidal
self-defense —is indifferent to what the
one killed wants, focusing entirely on
the good reason for homicide. This latter justification attends to what is objective and serves as a good reason for
anyone, regardless of what they want.
A good reason for me to kill an assailant will be a good reason for you or
anyone to kill that or any other relevantly similar assailant. Although it is
fanciful, the good reason for killing the
assailant will be a good reason for the
assailant to kill himself. For example,
if a Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde personality
were to exist and as Dr. Jekyll knew
that he would become a homicidal
Mr. Hyde, then, following the logic of
a good reason, Dr. Jekyll ought to kill
himself in order to prevent himself as
Mr. Hyde from killing harmless human
life. Because of their objective character,
good reasons subordinate an individual’s wants and desires to themselves.
Moreover, there is nothing in the logic
of a good-reason-based justification that
prohibits taking life without the consent of the one whose life is taken.
That the most widely accepted legal
and moral justification for homicide —
self-defense — has no regard for the
wishes of the one killed ought to make
society hesitant to establish medical
conditions as good reasons for killing
oneself and as good reasons for assisting another’s suicide. For, following
the dynamic of a good-reason-based
justification, the medical good reason
offered by the advocates of PAS is
inclined toward functioning indepen107
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dently of a patient’s autonomy as a
sufficient justification for suicide and
suicide-assistance.
In the arena of PAS, specifically how
would the dynamic of a good reason
operate independently of and in opposition to autonomy? Take, for example, the distinction, offered by those
who rely on the standard justification,
between a good and a bad reason. As
noted, this distinction partially undermines the autonomy of a patient who
may want to kill himself for a reason
that is not accepted as good. Moreover, by maintaining that a patient must
have a good reason for killing himself
in order to be assisted, by assisting
some to kill themselves, physicians
publicly state that certain patients have
good reasons for killing themselves.
Physicians thereby imply that patients
relevantly similar to those other patients also have good reasons for killing themselves. Thus, the autonomy
of patients who are similar but for their
not wanting to kill themselves to those
who have been assisted is jeopardized. In fact, the better the reason that
those who were assisted had for killing
themselves —and, thereby, the better the
reason physicians had for assisting
them — the more unreasonable relevantly similar individuals who do not
want to kill themselves would be if
they persist in not wanting to kill themselves. Thus, the objective character of
a good-reason-based justification threatens autonomy by either rejecting the
reasons that a patient has for killing
himself or by implying that, although
they do not want to kill themselves,
some patients have good reasons for
killing themselves and, to that extent,
ought to kill themselves.
In conclusion, I have presented the
opposed dynamics of the two elements of the standard justification. I
have sought the nexus between these
two elements that unites them to form
a functioning unit with its own dy108

namic. I find no link other than the
assertion that they are to be kept together. Given the lack of a significant
internal connection and the intrinsic
energies of these two elements as they
operate independently of and in opposition to one another, I find the standard justification highly labile and an
unsound basis for sound public policy.
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